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' 
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- E:~;:tensio11s of Remr1rks Oclobcr ! .,', 1 !Ju9 
DANGERS OF INVOLVEMENT IN 
ASIA 
There being no objection, the article 
was ordered to be printed In the RECORD, 
as follow&: 
1 From the Great Falls Tribune, Sept. 28, 
1969! 
MAJORITY LEADER MANSFIF.LD WARMS UNITED 
STATES ABOUT FURTHER INVOLVEMENT IN 
AsiA 
(By Wllllam D . Jam€6) 
A warning Sen. Mike Mansfield made last 
week that a deeper U.S. Involvement in Laos 
could develop Into a VIetnam-style military 
entanglement Ia drawing na.tlona.l a.nd In-
ternational attention because or the acc u-
racy or his grim predictions about the course 
ot the Vietnam war. 
The Senate Majority Leader based his 
warning about Laos on a trip he ma.de to 
Southeast Asia In Augus t at the request or 
Precldent Nixon. 
The trip was b ls s ixth !act-finding trip to 
Southeast Asia In the last 16 years. He made 
such trips in 1953, 1954, 1955, 1962, 1965 and 
1969. 
Mansfield, who J:u\8 investigated condltlons 
In Asia. a.t the request or Presidents R.oooe-
velt, Truman, Elaenhow&e, Kennedy, John-
son and Nixon, liM been consistent in warn-
ings that t.he U.S. should a.v01d gettlng lured 
into the quicksand o! Asl:i!otlc wars. 
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'file Montana senator bas been lauded tre-
q\Mlltly by national oorreapoDdente for an-
aly.lng Vletna.m evenia ~. Clayton 
l"r$W!!e;y. MUouliJ~ted eolumn!A1, 
compll~ M,...cl *'* J'lla1' for beUJI 
"tiM one I:Q&A, Co tNin ihe lleelnnlng, hM 
been. uncCl.llnil:r rliJ:bt ~ut U.S. luvol've--
ment In vtotllt.m.~ 
ltlter hrl'MtlJ1tilng cllOOitioDII In I.rldo-
chi:DII In 1M3; wbeo Uloe Jl'noe'.b wwe ctut 
tl.lbii~. ~ ncoc:Dl!lllelllded tbat ~be 
'(1 .8. ahou'kt UnFOY8 l.ia V'lfln~ prog,:ama. 
N~nr that - tbeA ...... IJIIeillodmc a.bou\ 
tU milliOn a year t~ b6 ~ that 
tbe aim o( our progJ'1lmS sbould. be to build 
up the selr-reliv.noe of tbe people. 
illlm.etlellt 11M mainlalned CODsistent!y 
su-e 11163 11111t 1 t w01111d be better to ba ve i.be 
ao.tlllee.s& .AIIIIaD8 I!Ghre &heir own pn>blems 
w.- to ha'M U.S. mUiiar)' fo...:. tlnolnd. 
''The at~ tn Vletaam aDd. m a larpr 
&en.M. ln. Ind•hlna, Is. grim aacS dl&eourag-
ln&" he reported after his 19M vt.t.lt. (On 
that trip, he alSo attencted the conference ot 
the Southeast Asia Treaty Orpnl~t!Qil 
(8BATO) 1n tb.e P.ll.llfpplneflat tbe request of 
Prell4en.t :hlenbows .) 
.. u· WOUld be mt.s~ an<! t'IJii.J.e," he 
lUPoid 1D. )Lis 1~ report. t4 tell tllle Senate or 
ihe people {)l the U.S. thU. COillllUOAons we.-e 
otlar than ~U1In and. <U&cow&Pni:. 
~need, he ~lafne4. "Is not to bury the 
realltt• at thfs anua~Qil but tO race them. 
howe'fW p1m jlllld dtllcew'I'C,inc they may be. 
I! ..,. do -, lt. Ill poatb.., that Ule revenal 
wlllab baa ~ ~ tn IDCiochlna may 
y!~ Wbl.ch bu. a)IIIUca*lon el.se-
w~lnAaa." 
"Tbls. expeclence coulQ be uae!Ql 1D avoU1~ 
Ins attn other eetl:lecu aDd d&magln.IJ: wute 
ot utold mllUons or dolla.rs or tbe resources 
ot tbe citizens of ihe u.s .. • he said.. 
:wau.aeld pOllltecl out !D 1964, when dis~ 
cUMtug the :Pftneh c1~a& ln TtMilam, tbat 
there had been a ee•en.l wncteDCy to "make 
tM Ph faiaM to the. ~· and con-
al.st,antly atl4 sel'lousllJ undereliUmate the 
stt~th" at the. !Ol'cea iit)l.t.lng ~e Fren.ch. 
"lt' there WIE one overrid.lng. cause o! the 
falllz.r&, howe¥er,~ he said, "It l.s to be found 
In ibe dlaturle4 emphule gnoen to Ule capec-
u:r of m!.Ut9.!'1 ~r.- alone to brulg about 
anendtatu~~~~lnindo~ 
cllllla..'' 
a. l&!d It would be <Umcult to see what 
mAM Ule U.S. coulQ have. done to avert a 
Oal):ununlst v.tctory over the Fl:enoh, "short o! 
~ foolhardy eommltment ot American 
troop& O!l tbe Aalan malllland. • 
.-ner a 1iilt to Vleill- ln 1155, Mans-
11.etle -cau. ~ u.e need to encowoqe 
tHe V:letnameM to \ake ~ o1 their own 
alfalra. 
''What Is at. stake IS the active loyalty of 
the IJreponcterance of the population or 
Bolltb Vietmlm. '!'hat can ))e won and held 
only by a ~ coveroment which 
ak:Cie ean  aDd respoDd to the 
n..- ot the peop~e. ·• 
Mansfield urged the U.S to c()I}COtntrate on 
helping with economic n~~very and develop-
ment programs. He said that ought to be 
done with a view to creating over a aet 
per1od of time a seU-suaialnlog Vietnam free 
from fUrther d.lreet reliance an U.S. assist-
ance. 
After visiting VIetnam In 1962, Manstleld 
expre8Sed serious doubt& about U.S. policies 
there. Be said there were about 12,000 Ameri-
cans there a;nd that U.S. spending totaled 
hundred& or mU!IoM annually there. 
"lt would " a dlsserYioe to my country 
not to voice a deep concern over the trend or 
events. stnce my las\ 111&1t,- he aald In h!s 
1962 J:eport. 
1\ was aeven years and U billion or U.S. 
aid later but yet, substantially, the same dl!-
11.culttes rematned U, Indeed, they have not 
been 90mpound~. he reponed. 
Be a~ Jeus. about. having the U.S. 
l~y IJIJPPM'\ Of ~ Yleinam- armed 
toro~~~~. 
"Th.ls lntensUicatlon, however, Inevitably 
has. carried us to the start ot the road which 
leads to ihe petnt at whl.oh conflict In Vtet-
nn.m could ~ of ~ier concern and 
greater responsibility to tbe U.S. than It Is 
to the goverlllli1'8ni and people 0: South V1ct-
nrun,. ~ he said. 
"1~ p1·eaent clJcumstances," he cautioned, 
"purS\lit or that courae could lnyolve an ex-
pendtture of Amertcan lives II.Ild r-.urces on 
a scale which would bea.r II ttle relationship 
to Ul* l.uteresta ot the U.S., or, Indeed, to the 
Interests of the people of VIetnam." 
To avoid that course, he asserted, It should 
be clear to ourselves as well a.s to the VIet-
namese where the primary responsibility was 
In thiS sl tuatlon: 
"It must rest, as It has rested, v•lth the 
VIetnamese government and people." 
concerned wlth the posslbU!ty that the 
war would be converted. Into an American 
one, fought primarily with American lives, 
he said: 
"It should be noted In all frankness that 
our own bureaucratic tendencies to act In 
uniform and enlarging patterns )lave resulted 
In an expansion ot the U.S. commitment In 
some places to an extent which would ap-
pear to bear only the remotest relationship 
to what Is essential or even desirable In 
terms or U.S. Interests." 
Mansfield and cODgresslonal colleagues who 
accompanied him em the 1962 trip agreed 
that the u.s. should! make a thorough re-
assessment of Ita. lll!<:urity requirements. 
Such security requlnments could be met, 
they Indicated, without any further exten-
sion or the U.S. commitment In Southeast 
Asia. 
Pointing out the perilS of having the U.S. 
assume too strong a role In Southeast Asi-
atic policies, Mansneld said In his 1962 re-
port: 
"It Is doubtful that It Is the best way ln 
any southeast Asian na.tlo~. li the responsi-
bility for Its Independent survival were to 
come to rest more heavily with the U.S. than 
with Indigenous leadership because of the 
failure or Inadequacies of that leadership In 
meeting Its own responsibilities to Its people." 
The Montana senator's warning of the 
"open-end danger or an expa.ndtng war" re-
ceived worldwide attention following his 1965 
trip to Southeast Asta. , 
Mansfield was pessimistic about chances 
for an early end of the war-In sharp oon-
trast to optimistic views of top U.S. mll1tary 
and elvillan omclals. 
"A rapid solution to the conflict Ln VIet-
nam Is not In Immediate prosped," he 
cautioned. 
Ma.rl-'field contended that despl te the great 
lru::rease In American military commitment, tt 
was doubtful, In view or the acceleration ot 
VIet Cong ellocta, tha.t the Saigon govern-
ment's poeltlon could be held without more 
U.S. forces. 
He said there was no assurance a.s to what 
ultimate Increase In U.S. military forces 
would be required. 
The question, he said, was not one or ap-
plying Increased U.S. preasure to a defined 
rnUltary situation, but Tather of "pressing 
against a rnllltary sltuat.on which Is, In ef-
fect, open-ended. 
"How open IS dependent on the extent to 
which North VIetnam and Its supporters are 
willing and able to meet lncrl'nsed force by 
Increased force," he said. 
The senator's "open-ended" warnlug was 
dlscUSI!ed frequently In the next three years 
as the U.S. saw Its military !orces In VIet-
nam grow to 560,000 and !a.talltles go over· 
the 30,000 mark. 
At the conclusion of his trip In August. 
Mansfield recommended to President Nixon 
that the U.S. place an Immediate ban on 
lncrea8e6 In U.S. personnel In Southeast Asia, 
In a report to the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, or wtllch he Is one of the rank-
Ing memben, Mansfield noied that our In-
volvement In Laos already has cost hundreds 
of millions or dollars and hundred• of lin". 
The Involvement In Laos ca.rrtes the 'tht·c~& 
or even a deeper commitment by tht- u s . 
he said. 
Congresslon&J colleague" or Mnnstlehl. 1\ho 
rf'gl\fd him us thelr let\dln& authority '"' 
Southeast A•lu, have been lmpres"t>d by Uw 
nectu·acy or hls scholarly rep<>rts after Pach 
or his fa.ct -finding trips. Many or his Sen at<' 
friends say It IS trag)c thnt hls advtce and 
warnings were Ignored. 
The record shows clearly that Mansfield was 
correct In his grim warnings about the 
dangers or a growing U.S. lnvolvt>ment ln 
VIetnam. 
The senator now Is warnlng the nation ,r 
what might develop I! the U.S. mak~ the 
same rn!Btakes In Laoe It did In VieLnnm 
OvERLY OPTIMISTIC V'IETNAM. QoorA'flONS 
(Eorroa's NO'l'E.-There have been so many 
optimistic statements about the VIetnam 
war that Phlllp Oeyelln, editorial page ctilLor 
o! the Washlng,ton Poat, made a collection 
of them. Oeyelln published hls Ust In the 
summer after Defense Secretary Laird de-
clared, "We have certainly turned the corner 
in the war." 
(Since. then. he probably haa added a com-
ment by President Nixon. The President de-
scribed the war a.s possibly "one or America •s 
finest hours, because we took a dl!!lcult task 
and we succeeded." 
(We are reprinting the article to show the 
difference In views between the men quoted 
by Oeyelln and those of Sen. Mike Mansfield 
appearing on this page.) 
"We have never been In a better relative 
posltlon."--General Westmoreland , April 10, 
1968. 
"We have reached an Important point 
when the end begins to come Into view .... 
The enemy has many problems: He Is losing 
control o! the scattered population under 
hls Influence ... He sees the strength of 
his forces steadily declining ... Hls mon-
soon offensives have been !allures. He was 
dealt a mortal blow by the Installation of a 
freely elected representative government 
... the enemy's hopes are bankrupt."-
General Westmoreland, Nov. 21, 1967. 
"We are generally pleased ... we are ,·ery 
sure we are on the right track''-Presldent 
Johnson, July 13, 1967. 
"Progress has been mode . . Wr have 
pushed the enemy farther and farther In to 
the jungles ... We have succeeded In at-
taining our objectlves,"--General WE'stmore-
land, July 13. 1967. 
" I expect the . . war to achieve vNy sen-
sational results In 1967."-Aml>:l,..,tdor Lo<ig~. 
Jan. 9, 1967. 
"We are beginning to see ""me s igns oC 
success ... There Is an erosion o! (enemy 1 
morale."-Secretary or State Rusk, Aug 25. 
1966. 
"We have stopped losing the war."-Secrr-
tary of Defense McNamara , October, 1965. 
"We are not about to senrt American boys 
nine or ten thousn!1d mliPs from hOmE' to tlo 
what Asian boys ought to be doing for tb0m-
selves."-Presldent Johnson. Oct. 21, 1964. 
"The war In Yietnam Is on thr rlgt:t 
track."-AmbRssador Lodge, June 30. 1964 
"I thin'< the number lof U.S. personnel) \n 
VIetnam lS not likely to Increase substantl<~l­
ly ''-Secretary of DefensE' ll'cNnm.·u.l, !lhy 
i4, 1964. 
"The VIetnamese . . . themselves c 111 
handle thls problem with their own effort ... _ 
Secretary of State nusk. F~l). 2'4, 1964. 
"The United States stili hopes to wlthdrE<w 
Its troops from Sou th V!Hnam by tbe Pn'l 
of 1965."-Secreto.t·y of DefeN>e Mt:-!Rinnm, 
Feb. 19, 1964. 
" I am h opeful we can bring b1wk nrltli -
Uonal ... men ... because r pcrf!.mal!y 
believe this Is a war the VIetnamese must 
fight. "I don't believe we can take on th~ t 
combat task for them "-secretary of De-
fense McNamara, Feb. 3. 1964. 
"VIctory ... Is just months away, and the 
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reductiOn ot American advisors can begln 
any tl.me now . . . I can safely say the end 
of the W&r Ia In slght."--Gen. Paul D. 
Marltlns, commander of the Mll1tary Assist-
ance Command 1n S&lgon, Oct. 31. 1963. 
"Seoretary McNamara and Oen. (Maxwell) 
Taylor reported their Judi'ment that the 
major part of the U.s . m.IUtary task can be 
oomplet.d by the end of 1966 .. . "-White 
Hou.ae statement, Oct. ~. 1963. 
"I t.el we ahall I<Chltve victory In 1964."-
Tram Van Don&, Eouth VIetnamese gen~ral, 
Oot. l, 1~. 
"South VIetnam Ia on Its way to vic-
tory ... "-Frederlc.lt 1!:. Nolttni', U.S . ambas-
ll&dor to South VIetnam, June 12, 1963. 
"The South VIetnamese themBelves are 
lilhtln& their own battle, ft&htlng well."-
Secret&ry of St.te Rusk, April , 1963. 
"(The strunle) Is turnlni' an Important 
OOI'ner."--8ecretary of Sta.te Rusk, March 8, 
1963. 
"The oorner has definitely been turned to-
waro Tlctory 1n South Vletnam."-Arthur 
Sylv..tc, AM!stant Secret&ry of Defense, 
l4areh 8, 1963. 
"'~'here are deftn.ltely encoura.glng elements 
•.. the n.tt.o of casualties ... lndlcatee some 
tUl'DUaJ In the mtuatl.on."-.secretary or 
State ltuak, Feb. 1, 1963. 
"The ,.r 1n Vtetnam Is goinr; well and will 
aucceec1."--Becretary McNamara, Jan. 81, 
19t3. 
"The South VIetnamese should achieve 
Tlctory 1n three years ... I am conftdent the 
Vletnam.eae are 101n1 to win the war. (The 
VIet Con&) f- Inevitable deteat."-Adm. 
Harry D . Felt, U.S. Commander-In-Chief of 
Paclll.c Porces, Jan. 12, 1963. 
"Jrvery quantl.tatlve measurement shows 
ws're wlnnlng the w&r . . . U.S. aid to VIetnam 
hu reached a peak and will start to level 
otf."~tary ot Defense McNa.me.ra, 1962. 
"Tbe Communtata now realize they can 
never conquer tree Vletruun."--Gen. J . W. 
Dante!, o111.olal military aide to VIetnam, 
Jan. 8, 19el. 
"The American aid prognun In VIetnam has 
proved an enormous success, one of the 
m.a}cx \'t.otortea of American policy -
o.n. J. w. Daniel, omclal mlllte.ry aide to 
VIetnam, Sept. 7, 1900. 
Octobe1· J .J, 1 !JG.<J 
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